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COGNITIVE FRAMES AS CO-DETERMINANTS OF 
PERSISTENT PERFORMANCE DIFFERENTIALS
ABSTRACT
The present study extends the competence-based view by appealing to cognitive frames as co-
determinants of persistent performance differentials. It is suggested that financial performance is
influenced by a causal chain running from cognitive frames through constrained information
processing and perceived uncertainty. The empirical test provides evidence from survey data
and archival data supporting this assertion. We are aware of no previous work that explicitly
states or tests this causal chain. Furthermore, we introduce a novel method to estimate path
models when the usual approach is infeasible.
Key words: Cognitive frames, Information processing, Uncertainty.
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COGNITIVE FRAMES AS CO-DETERMINANTS OF 
PERSISTENT PERFORMANCE DIFFERENTIALS
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that decision makers faced with problems in
an uncertain and complex world need a set of guiding principles in order to structure and
coordinate actions (Kellaris et al., 1996, Levinthal & March, 1993; Rabin, 1998). The core of
this argument is well-established (see e.g.,  Rabin, 1998), and founded on the idea that cognitive
frames provide a simplifying heuristic used to manage the unlimited detail of everyday life. In
consequence, accomplishing simplification entails ignorance of some detail and thus loss of
information. However, what specific information gets lost depends on the particular frame used.
By tracing how firm-specific cognitive frames influence financial performance, the
present work adds to the strategy literature by extending the general suggestion that
information not relevant for a particular cognitive frame will tend to be ignored. The
contribution may be summed up in the general proposition that firm-specific cognitive frames
are important co-determinants of persistent performance differentials. This proposition, to be
justified in the following, lends support to the emerging capabilities- or competence-based view
of the firm (for an overview, see Teece et al., 1997) and suggests that the literature on cognitive
frames may enrich the understanding of the, arguably, central question in strategy: why do firms
differ? The suggested connection between cognitive frames and performance is established in a
two step argument. 
First, ignoring information not relevant for a particular cognitive frame will tend to
increase perceived uncertainty (Kiesler and Sproull 1982). Always at the potential cost of
increased uncertainty, cognitive frames enable a more clear conceptualization of one part of the
world when other parts are ignored (Levinthal & March, 1993). Second, it is commonly
accepted that both perceived uncertainty and information processing may influence financial
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performance, i.e., perceived uncertainty should decrease performance whereas information
processing should increase performance (see e.g. Pfeffer, 1997). 
This two-step argument establishes a causal chain in which cognitive frames are sources
of ignorance. In turn, ignorance is a potential cause of uncertainty, and, uncertainty influences
performance. Now, since cognitive frames may be conceived as rather stable firm-specific
frames of reference containing unquestioned assumptions (Shrivastava & Schneider, 1984), we
have then established that cognitive frames may have an important role as co-determinants of
persistent performance differentials. Thus, the present paper adds to previous capabilities- or
competence-based theory by identifying an explicit chain of causality between cognitive frames
and performance, and, on this basis, suggesting how cognitive frames may be a source of
persistent performance differentials among firms which otherwise share similar industrial
conditions. Note that the usual argument in the competence-based literature hinges upon
resource immobility, demand- or supply-side uncertainty and resource heterogenity (see e.g.
Peteraf, 1993). The present argument extends this line of reasoning by suggesting how specific
causes for immobility and uncertainty (i.e. ignorance entailing the use of cognitive frames) by
way of an explicit and testable causal chain may translate into performance differentials.
Although the theoretical argument is general, the empirical test is limited to two cognitive
frames (a strategic frame and a cost frame) and scoped within the context of issues related to
the natural environment. This choice is motivated in the ensuing section.
Linking Cognitive Frames and Financial Performance
The general argument linking cognitive frames and financial performance hinges on the
commonly accepted idea that performance decreases in uncertainty. In the process of using
cognitive frames, some information is lost and when it is important information, uncertainty
increases. Not all ignored information is important for financial performance but some is.
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Therefore, the use of some particular cognitive frame which ignore information important for
financial performance will increase uncertainty. Whether the relationship between cognitive
frames and performance is a direct one or involves mediation by uncertainty is spelled out in the
ensuing. Before doing this, however, it is necessary to define the boundaries within which the
argument can be tested empirically. We proceed as follows. 
First, all cognitive frames involve simplification, loss of information, and so forth. But
only some cognitive frames may influence financial performance. Therefore, we first identify a
specific set of cognitive frames which according to the literature are likely to have this property.
Second, since our test involves the need to operationalize uncertainty and information
processing, we also need to select a particular empirical context within which these constructs
are salient and may be defined in a meaningful way. Third, having selected a specific set of
cognitive frames and narrowed the scope of the empirical test to a case where uncertainty is a
persistent feature of the context for the firm’s decision making, we proceed to formulate
hypotheses limited within these bounds. 
That is, the specific nature of any construct which may be chosen to test our argument
forces us to formulate specific rather than general hypotheses. Evaluating whether the
conclusions extend to other cognitive frames and empirical settings involves assessment of
external validity in the sense originally defined by Campbell & Stanley (1966), i.e., the
formulation of a new set of hypotheses consistent with the argument that cognitive frames may
be co-determinants of persistent performance differentials. In this case, we predict that is always
possible to find relatively stable cognitive frames which influence financial performance through
uncertainty and information processing in any region, industry or strategic group within which
persistent performance differentials are observed.
Selecting cognitive frames for the empirical test. In this section, we motivate our
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choice of the particular cognitive frames to  be used for the empirical test and establish their link
to uncertainty and information processing. We start by characterizing the two broad and
mutually exclusive cognitive frames, strategic focus and cost focus, chosen for the empirical test
due to their ubiquity in theory and practice (see e.g. Porter, 1980; Rumelt et al.,  1995). The
relation between these two cognitive frames and allocative and adaptive efficiency suggest they
capture fundamental ideas of what business is about. Thus, if allocative efficiency is
emphasized, managers will increase exploitation of the existing alternatives whereas
emphasizing adaptive efficiency will increase the exploration for new alternatives. This also
implies a difference in time-horizon and scope for the two cognitive frames.
Allocative efficiency is usually associated with a short-term cost  frame whereas adaptive
efficiency is associated with a long-term strategic frame (Levinthal & March, 1993). Moreover,
the scope of search is broad when a strategic frame directs decision making and it is narrow
when guided by a cost  frame (Levinthal & March, 1993). Given the competence in evaluating
alternatives, differences in framing will influence the scope of search. A cost frame will tend to
ignore effects distant from immediate antecedents of efficiency (Levinthal & March, 1993).
Therefore, a cost  frame economizes on sample size of relevant alternatives but  will increase the
number of potential surprises due to a narrow sample of possible futures (Levinthal & March,
1993). By contrast, a strategic frame will, at the cost of large samples of alternatives, tend to
include distant effects and thus reduce potential surprises (Ibid.). Observations within the
context of utilization of information technology lend support to this conjecture. Thus Fletcher
& Wright (1995) found that a general reliance on traditional cost-benefit appraisal methods for
integration of new information technology indicates a short-term, rather than a long-term
strategic, focus for information systems use.
Hence, the use of the particular cognitive frames, “strategic focus” and “cost focus”
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entails two effects. First, there is a hypothesized effect on information processing intensity, i.e.,
gathering more or less information on a particular outcome related to a subject matter. Second,
there is an effect on sample size, i.e., gathering information on a more or less broad collection
of possible outcomes. In the following paragrahps, we shall develop separate hypotheses
concerning these effects. Before doing this, however, it is necessary to specify the bounds
placed on the hypotheses due to considerations regarding the appropriate focus and sample of
the empirical test.
Selecting the context for the empirical test. Even if the theoret ical argument is general,
the empirical test  is limited to the two cognitive frames “strategic focus” and “cost focus” and
bounded within the context of environmental issues. That is, the hypotheses are bounded within
a sample of firms that are influenced by environmental issues, and, cognitive frames, information
processing and uncertainty all concern the firm’s consideration, or ignorance, of such issues.
Since our hypotheses are limited by these considerations, it is necessary to motivate the scope
of the empirical test before turning to the formulation of hypotheses. The discussion whether
the hypotheses may be generalized to other samples and situations is postponed to the
concluding section. 
In order to test the hypotheses drawn on the above argument, we were looking for a
case where some uncertainty should be a persistent feature of the context for the firm’s decision
making. Although many settings were possible, we focussed upon firms which produced high
amounts of hazardous waste, and,  therefore, were prone to influence by stakeholders promoting
various different issues related to the natural environment. In light of the last twenty years
public focus on firms’ behavior towards the natural environment, it is increasingly important for
managers to consider non-market stakeholders such as government agencies, pressure groups
and media. According to the literature on this subject (see e.g. the material contained in
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Harrison & Freeman, 1999 and Fischer & Schot, 1993), issues related to the natural
environment thus introduce the turbulence necessary to test the argument suggested in the
present study. 
Linking cognitive frames and performance within the bounds of the empirical test.
We now turn to formulating hypotheses which stipulate a possible relation between strategic
frames, cost frames, information processing, perceived uncertainty and financial performance.
Since the effects of environmental issues are usually distant from immediate efficiency concerns,
but relevant for strategic reasons (Fischer and Schot, 1993), a strategic frame and a cost frame
have assymetric effects on information processing. Since non-market stakeholders associated
with environmental issues are irrelevant in terms of narrowly focussed cost and efficiency
considerations, a cost frame should lead to an absence of information processing related to
environmental issues. By contrast, a strategic frame should lead to high information processing
intensity related to environmental issues since non-market stakeholders often raise new issues,
some of which may potentially hurt the firm financially.
H1.1 A strategic frame leads to high information processing intensity related to
environmental issues.
H1.2 A cost frame leads to an absence of information processing related to
environmental issues.
Furthermore, there is a direct effect of cognitive frames on sample size. Decision makers
with a strategic frame will consider large samples of possible outcomes whereas a cost frame
implies narrow samples. Therefore, the number of situations to which point probabilities are
assigned to outcomes of actions will tend to be larger when decision makers are characterized
by a strategic frame. In other words, the number of potential surprises will decrease. When a
cost frame applies, the logic is reversed. Defining uncertainty as the situations in which point
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probabilities are not assigned to outcomes of actions (Runde, 1998) leads to an inverse relation
between cost and strategic frame regarding the uncertainty of non-market influences such as
stakeholder claims related to environmental issues.
H1.3 A strategic frame reduces uncertainty related to environmental issues.
H1.4 A cost frame increases uncertainty related to environmental issues.
Considering environmental issues, it is suggested that a strategic frame has two distinct
effects. The sample size of alternatives considered will be larger and the evaluation of
alternatives will improve due to increased information processing intensity. Understanding
search for alternatives as an activity of mutual engagement with the firm’s stakeholders suggests
that representations may be formed, and not  merely updated, when information processing
intensity is increased. Hence, the effect of a strategic frame on uncertainty related to
environmental issues may be mediated by information processing. A cost frame entails no
mediation due to the absence of information processing directed towards environmental issues.
H1.5 The relation between a strategic frame and uncertainty related to
environmental issues is mediated by information processing.
H1.6 The relation between a cost frame and uncertainty related to environmental
issues is not mediated by information processing.
We next consider the relation between decision making and outcomes. First, there is a
straightforward relation between uncertainty and performance. Increased uncertainty will tend
to reduce performance because uncertainty entails a weak causal link between actions and
outcomes as well as costly adjustments following surprises. Second, information processing
improves alternat ive evaluation because it increases the correspondance between the subjective
and objective aspects of decision making, i.e., between cognitive frames and social regularities. 
Specifically, information processing increases the correspondance between the actual
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and perceived importance of non-market factors such as stakeholder claims. Given the
reasonable assumption of costly information processing, a threshold will exist beyond which the
marginal effect of a further increase in information processing is negative. Clearly, uncertainty
and instability raises this threshold and the amount of information processing needed to reach it
will increase. By contrast, in a simple and stable world information processing will become too
costly very fast . Since our argument and empirical test  concerns a context characterized by a
relatively high degree of uncertainty and instability, we represent our argument without this
qualification in order to retain parsimony.
H2.1 Increased uncertainty related to environmental issues reduces financial
performance.
H2.2 Increased information processing related to environmental issues increases
financial performance.
As aforementioned, information processing is understood as an active search process
where representations may be formed, and not merely updated. Hence, increased information
processing intensity entails cognitive frames that  better correspond to actual events. Cognitive
frames that better correspond to actual events will be more accurate and perhaps cover a larger
portion of reality. Uncertainty has a double role. As stated in H2.1, the direct effect of
uncertainty will decrease performance. Moreover, since uncertainty implies that the necessary
conceptual frames for information processing to take place are not present, this indirect effect
will also decrease performance. This implies that information processing will have a negative
mediating effect on the relation between uncertainty and performance.
H2.3 Information processing has a negative mediating effect on the relation between
uncertainty related to environmental issues and financial performance.
It should be noted that a decrease in performance well beyond the aspired level will tend
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to increase information processing (March, 1988). However, the argument concerning the
relation between uncertainty, information processing and performance suggests that the success
in uncovering and adopting useful alternatives critically depends on the cognitive frame that
directs information processing. That is, a cost frame might well lead to an ignorance-trap where
an increase in information processing or search uncovers the wrong alternatives.
We have suggested that cognitive frames might influence information processing and
uncertainty but do not find it plausible to suggest a general causal link between framing effects
and financial performance. Avoiding the prediction of null effects, this leads to  the following
hypotheses.
H3.1 The relation between a strategic frame and financial performance is completely
mediated by information processing and uncertainty.
H3.2 The relation between a cost frame and financial performance is completely
mediated by uncertainty.
The hypothesized relations are summarized in the path-diagram shown in Figure 1. As
can be seen, the three sets of hypotheses imply that a cost frame will tend to decrease financial
performance due to an increase in uncertainty and an absence of information processing. By
contrast, a strategic frame entails a positive effect on performance. In sum, the hypotheses
establish a causal chain where cognitive frames are co-determinants of financial performance.
-----------------------------------
Figure 1 about here
-----------------------------------
It is important to note that the relations shown in Figure 1 are hypothesized to hold only
in a context characterised by turbulence. It is quite possible that a cost frame may be
appropriate in some contexts, for example when stability is high and non-market effects absent.
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As noted, the present study is scoped within the context of issues related to the natural
environment. Since firms which are affected by such issues are likely to experience turbulence
and unexpected stakeholder demands, this context is one in which the relations shown in Figure
1 can be assumed to hold. There is, however, one further snag associated with the model shown
in Figure 1. Since it  is impossible to ident ify the model without imposing further constraints,  it
cannot be estimated by a simultaneous equation approach to path-analysis. The solution to this
problem is presented in the following section.
METHODS
Estimation procedure
The hypothesized causal relations were summarised in the path diagram shown in Figure
1. As previously noted, a structural equations approach to path-analysis is infeasible for
estimation of this model since it cannot be identified. Moreover,  because the independent
variables are correlated, the assumptions for such an approach are violated. In consequence, we
devised a novel estimation procedure in order to handle this problem. Figure 2 shows the
general procedure. Note that the diamond, in compressed form, captures the relations shown in
Figure 1.
-----------------------------------
 Figure 2 about here
-----------------------------------
As shown, estimation of the model can be decomposed into a four-step estimation
procedure. The first and the second step in the procedure tests whether the two partial mediator
effects are present. The third step is necessary to test  whether mediation between the
independent(s) and the dependent is complete or partial. Finally, the fourth step is needed to
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establish whether the effect  between the independent(s) and the dependent is in fact mediated by
the two intermediate variables. An obvious alternative explanation is that significant mediator
effects established in step one and two just represent variance which is “shuffled” around. To
reject this alternative, a significant effect in step four has to be shown. Furthermore, the sign of
the independent variable should approximately reflect the net effect on the dependent variable
according to the estimates obtained in step one and two. 
In sum, on basis of the above four steps, models of the type shown in Figure 2 can be
estimated. Since yet larger models can be broken down into models of the type shown in Figure
2, the method is general and lends itself readily to empirical tests in a number of situations
where structural modelling cannot be pursued. Obviously, there is a trade-off between the
requirements of theory and parsimony in the choice of estimation method. Clearly, a structural
equations approach should be used when applicable. However, there might be cases, as in the
present study, where theoretical considerations should override the constraints of a particular
estimation method. Having provided an overview of the est imation procedure, a brief account
of the estimation method is in order. 
Estimation: step one and two. To establish mediation, estimation in step one is carried
out by three linear regression-equations (OLS-estimation) following Baron and Kenny’s (1986)
suggestions for differentiation of moderator and mediator effects of third variables. Estimation
in step two follows an identical procedure.
It is important to notice that mediation does not concern interaction (moderation). It is
an intermediate mechanism that accounts for the relation between the independent and the
dependent variable. For example, mediators may explain how external events are endogenized,
i.e. take on psychological significance. By contrast, a moderator, in the form of an external
event, may explain when the effect of another external event takes on psychological
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significance. That is, the term “moderator effect” is equivalent to the commonly used term
“interaction effect,” however mediation is different. To test for mediation we estimate a series
of regression analyses where the path from the independent to the dependent variable is
controlled. When the effect of the independent variable and the mediator variable are both
significant, mediation holds if, further, the independent variable has less effect when the
mediator is controlled. In step one, this involves estimation of three regression equations: (1)
regressing the mediator on the independent variable, (2) regressing the dependent variable on
the independent variable, and (3) regressing the dependent variable in both the independent
variable and on the mediator (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Mediation is established when: (1) the
effect of the indendent variable is significant in the two first  equations, (2) the effect of the
mediator is significant in the third equation, and (3) the effect of the independent variable is less
in the third equation. There is perfect mediation when the independent variable has no effect
when the mediator is controlled. 
Estimation: step three. Estimated by linear regression (OLS-estimation).
Estimation: step four. Step four includes the model’s mediator variables (Z-variables in
Figure1) as instrumental variables (IV) in a two-stage least-squares estimation. The method and
the associated test-statistics are described in appendix A. The purpose of the estimation is to
test  for the relation between the model’s independent and dependent variable given the
instrumental variables. In two-stage least-squares regression, estimates are obtained through
two regressions (appendix A). The first stage estimates values of the problematic predictor(s)
and the second stage regresses the dependent variable on those values to obtain valid estimates
of the model. Since asymptotic efficiency is not guaranteed, it is important to apply statistical
tests for model-misspecification. This is done by estimating Sargan’s (1964) general test of
misspecification. Moreover, R2 is not a valid measure of the goodness of fit in two-stage least-
-15-
square models. Instead we propose that Pesaran & Smith’s (1994) generalized R2 (GR2) be
used. Since they are not widely used (or included in soft-ware packages), the computation of
Sargan’s test and GR2 are shown in appendix A.
Data
The data in this study originate from a survey conducted during the winter of 1995
supplemented by financial data subsequent ly acquired from an independent publicly available
source. The survey was conducted by Kommunekemi, a state-owned Danish firm that processes
hazardous waste. For most types of hazardous waste, Kommunekemi is the mandatory
alternative for Danish firms. It is important to note that all companies in our survey are
customers of Kommunekemi and that the relationship between Kommunekemi and their
customers reflects a high degree of mutual trust. For example, Kommunekemi has helped with
expertise in a number of incidents, such as explosions and chemical spills. Information about
such incidents is very sensitive and, clearly, mutual trust is important. All respondents were told
that their questionnaire would be used by Kommunekemi on a confidential basis and that
dissemination of information to other parties would be in anonymous form. Subsequently, we
were allowed to use the questionnaire for research purposes subject to the condition that results
are reported in anonymous form only.
The population was defined as all Danish firms that produce hazardous waste as a by-
product of their primary activities (approximately 10,000 firms). Examples of such firms include
paint producers, the medical industry, and electroplating firms. After exclusion of the smallest
waste producers (less than 5 tonnes per year), and state or municipality owned companies, the
target population  totalled 858 firms that each produce more than 5 tonnes of hazardous waste
each year (90% of the total volume of hazardous waste produced in Denmark). Clearly, these
companies are likely to be among the firms most influenced by stakeholder claims related to the
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natural environment.
A disproportionate sample with two strata was drawn. One stratum included the 36
major producers, defined as the companies in the sample which produce 50% of the total
volume of hazardous waste. The second stratum included the remaining 822 producers, 50% of
these producers were randomly selected and mailed a self-administered questionnaire. The
response rate was 40%. Among the 36 largest  producers of hazardous waste qualitative
interviews of one to two hours duration were conducted. As only five firms refused to
participate, a total of 31 firms were interviewed. In the large firms the respondents were
typically the person in charge of the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) function. In firms
without an EH&S function the respondent was typically the CEO of the company. In both
instances there is no doubt that the respondent  possessed adequate knowledge. Extensive non-
response analyses were conducted among the medium-sized non-respondents; these analyses
indicate no substantial discrepancy between respondents and non-respondents (a summary of
these analyses are available from the first author). Consequently, with a high degree of
confidence, the findings can be generalized to the population. 
Measuring financial performance. The financial data used to measure performance
were obtained from a publicly accessible electronic database (CD-Direct,  published by
Købmandstandens Oplysningsbureau, Denmark). Financial performance is measured as the
return on assets (ROA) calculated as the net income of primary activities after depreciation, but
before net financial gains, extraordinary earnings, and taxes. The base is the end of the fiscal
year.
Our financial data span the years 1991 to 1995. It was only possible to obtain valid
ROA for 141 firms as the rest of the sample were business units in larger firms, and therefore
independent, external data were not available. Of these, one firm was excluded because of an
-17-
extreme low ROA (-425%) in the most recent year (1995) strongly suggesting the firm as an
outlier. We measure both short-term and long-term financial performance. Short-term financial
performance is calculated as the ROA in 1995. Long-term financial performance is measured as
the cumulated ROA in the period 1991-95 calculated as: 
roai = (1+roa91/100)×(1+roa92/100)×(1+roa93/100)×(1+roa94/100)×(1+roa95/100).
Since the measure was obtained through a publicly available data source independent of
the survey-data and since all analyses were validated with financial performance as dependent
variable, we can rule out common methods bias. Finally, it is worth noticing that the bias
sometimes associated with accountancy data is minimized because it will tend to even out over
a longer period, e.g. over five years.
Measuring cognitive frames. In the present study we use the broad frames cost focus
and strategic focus as a proxy for cognitive frames. Furthermore, the scope is limited to
integration of issues related to the natural environment. According to this operationalization, a
strategic frame and a cost frame related to environmental issues are broad cognitive frames that
act to direct managerial attention. As evidenced in the large literature on the role of strategic
versus cost focus, these constructs provide excellent illustration of cognitive frames since they
are commonly reported to serve as prototypes for concept driven information processing (see
e.g. Fletcher & Wright,  1996). As previously noted, the empirical literature on the firm’s
environmental (green) strategy (e.g. Klassen & Whybark, 1999 and Fischer & Schot, 1993)
further suggest their importance.
A five-point semantic scale was used  (1: “disagree strongly” to 5: “agree strongly”) to
measure the two constructs. A strategic frame was measured by the two items: (1) an
environmental certification is a source of competitive advantage, and (2) to be environmentally
conscious gives strategic advantage. Also, a cost frame was measured by two items: (1)
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environmental initiatives make our products more costly, and (2) our competitiveness decreases
if we initiate environmental initiatives. Additive conjunctive scales were formed including the
two sets of items. The assessment of scale-reliability through estimation of Cronbach’s Alpha
supported the notion that the two items in each scale capture different dimensions of a common
construct (Table 1). It should be noted that the Alpha obtained on the two-item construct
“strategic frame” is 0.57, a rather low value even if it is above the acceptable limit (0.50).
However, this value should be interpreted in view of the item-dependent nature of Cronbach’s
Alpha. It is recommendable to assess the item-dependent improvement in Alpha by the general
Spearman-Brown formula (Peter, 1979). Such an estimation shows that the value  0.57
obtained on the two-item construct “strategic frame” would increase to 0.80 in an equivalent
five-item (and 0.87 in a seven-item) construct. Therefore, we conclude this construct to be
acceptable in terms of scale-reliability.
Measuring the degree of contextualized information processing. In the present study
we measure the firm’s processing of information within the specific context related to
environmental issues. We refer to this construct as contextualized information processing. Since
the actual processing of information is not easily measured, we developed a construct which is
supposed to correlate highly with information processing activity within the part icular context
measured in the present study.
This construct captures contextualized information processing as company-wide
discussions of environmental issues and items regarding environmental policy (policy
formulation, distribution of knowledge about policy, top management involvement in policy
formation and employee involvement in policy implementation). The measure includes both
process (discussion and involvement) and state variables (presence of a clear environmental
policy and the distribution of knowledge about such policy).
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Contextualized information processing was measured with five items, chosen according
to their importance in the empirical literature (see e.g. the material contained in Harrison &
Freeman, 1999), that capture alternative dimensions of this activity in the context of the natural
environment. A five-point semantic scale was used  (1: “disagree strongly” to 5: “agree
strongly”). The measurement of environmental information processing was anchored by using
four dimensions related to environmental policies: (1)  formulation of clear environmental
policy, (2) knowledge of the firm’s environmental policy among employees, (3) top
management involvement in policy formation, and (4) employee involvement in the
implementation of environmental practices in the firm. A fifth item captures  the extent to which
environmental issues are discussed in the firm. An additive conjunctive scale was formed
including all five items. The assessment of scale-reliability through estimation of Cronbach’s
Alpha (0.87) supported the notion that  the five items capture different  dimensions of the
common construct, information processing in relation to the natural environment.
The 31 qualitative interviews conducted in the present study were used to assess face
validity of the construct used to measure information processing. Consider the following  rather
typical excerpt from the interview t ranscripts as illustration:
Large chemical producer: “The environmental policy implies that we discuss and look
through things regularly. ... you talk to people out there...”
In numerous instances, the 31 interviews clearly showed that actual information processing
activity is highly related to internal discussions of environmental problems, the presence of an
environmental policy, distribution of knowledge about such policy and involvement in its
implementation (further interview transcripts in English and full transcripts in Danish are
available from the author). Since these dimensions are captured in our measure of information
processing (regarding environmental issues) we have a high degree of confidence in the face
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validity of the construct used to measure the intensity of contextualised information processing. 
Measuring uncertainty. We constrain measurement of uncertainty within the scope of
the present study. Uncertainy regarding environmental issues was measured as: (1) uncertainty
leading to delays in handling environmental problems, and (2) general uncertainty related to
integration of environmental considerations in the operation and management of the firm. A
five-point semantic scale was used  (1: “disagree strongly” to 5: “agree strongly”). An additive
conjunctive scale was formed including these two items. The assessment of scale-reliability
through estimation of Cronbach’s Alpha supported the notion that the two items capture
different dimensions of the common construct, uncertainty in relation to the natural environment
(Table 1). Since the concept of uncertainty has many meanings it  should be noted that this
construct captures the perceived difficulties in representing considerations related to the natural
environment in terms of operations and management. This use of the concept of uncertainty
corresponds well to the notion of Knightian or Keynesian uncertainty as situations in which
point probabilities are not assigned to outcomes of actions (Runde, 1998). As aforementioned,
the item-dependent nature of Cronbach’s Alpha has to be taken into consideration when
interpreting scale-reliability. Estimation using the general Spearman-brown formula shows that
a two-item Alpha of 0.60 would increase to 0.82 in an equivalent five-item (and 0.88 in a seven-
item) construct.
Controls. Measures were included to control for the firm’s size, age and the total
amount of dangerous waste produced. This is motivated by the following considerat ions. It is
possible that the amount of the firm’s resources and thus size will influence both performance
and the firm’s general level of information processing positively. Likewise, the age of the firm
could influence the firm’s performance and general level of information processing negatively
due to either inertia associated with old age or limited experience associated with newness
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(Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Since we measure contextualized information processing related to
environmental issues, we also need to consider if the level of information processing is merely
influenced by the amount of hazardous waste produced.
The firm’s size is measured by the number of employees on basis of publicly available
archival data. The same source was used to obtain data on the firm’s age. The total amount of
dangerous waste was obtained through the questionnaire. Kommunekemi a/s holds archival data
of the total amount of dangerous waste produced by each firm in the present survey and the
firms were aware of this fact. Therefore, we expect this information to be reliable.
-----------------------------------
Table 1 about here
-----------------------------------
RESULTS
The ensuing analysis follows the four-step procedure for estimation of difficult path-
models described in the above. 
Estimation: step one. Estimation in step one (and two) involves three sets of linear
regression-equations (OLS-estimation) following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) suggestions for
estimation of mediator effects.  Table 2 shows the first set of analyses. In model 1.0,  a strategic
frame and a cost frame related to environmental issues has assymetric effects on information
processing. Supporting H1.1 and H1.2, the relation between a cost frame and information
processing is absent whereas the relation between a strategic frame and information processing
is positive and significant. As model 1.1 shows, the controls only have a minor effect.
-----------------------------------
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Table 2 about here
-----------------------------------
Furthermore, the results show an inverse relation between a cost and a strategic frame
regarding the perceived uncertainty related to issues of the natural environment. In model 2.0, a
strategic frame reduces uncertainty related to environmental issues whereas a cost frame
increases uncertainty, lending support to H1.3 and H1.4. Note that when the variable
“information processing” is included in model 3.0, the effect of the independent variable
“strategic frame” is no longer significant. These results lend strong support to  the idea that
information processing mediates the effect between a strategic frame and uncertainty, thus
supporting H1.5. 
First, model 1.0 shows that the effect of information processing regressed on a strategic
frame is significant  and model 2.0 shows that the effect of uncertainty regressed on a strategic
frame is significant. Second, the effect of information processing is significant in model 3.0.
Third, the effect of a strategic frame is not significant in model 3.0. Note further, that the effect
of “cost frame” is stable across the estimations in model 2.0 and 3.0 suggesting that the
estimated effects are robust . Inspection of model 1.1 shows that the control variable
“employees” has a positive but insignificant influence on information processing. Models 2.1
and 3.1 shows that “employees” has a significant and positive influence on uncertainty. In other
words, as the firm increases in size the perceived uncertainty regarding environmental issues
also increases. Since the controls add to the explained variance without confounding the
estimates, we conclude that the estimates in model 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0. are robust.
In sum, the results in model 1.0 to 3.1 support the idea that the relation between a
strategic frame and uncertainty related to environmental issues is mediated by information
processing. Finally, models 1.0 to 3.1 support  H1.6. A cost frame related to environmental
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issues has a direct positive effect on uncertainty related to such issues and information
processing does not mediate the effect between a cost frame and uncertainty. This result
suggests that a cost frame related to environmental issues, as a general cognitive frame, leads
managers to overlook the very problems that cause uncertainty, and, to maintain an absence of
information processing that could otherwise change the state of ignorance.
-----------------------------------
Table 3 about here
-----------------------------------
Estimation: step two. The results in model 5.0 show that uncertainty related to
environmental issues has a negative effect on long-term financial performance (supporting
H2.1). Model 6.0 establishes the expected positive effect of information processing on financial
performance (supporting H2.2). Model 4.0 shows that  uncertainty has a significant negative
effect on information processing. Since the effect of uncertainty disappears in model 7.0, all
three conditions are fulfilled for establishing information processing as mediator between
uncertainty related to environmental issues and long-term financial performance (supporting
H2.3).
Including the controls in model 6.1 and 7.1 does not effect the results. By contrast, the
inclusion of controls in model 4.1 has a significant effect. Explanatory power increases due to a
significant negative age-effect and a positive size-effect (employees) on information processing.
These are spurious effects due to the multicollinearity introduced by the positive correlation
among the controls. The same effects cause the reduction of explanatory power in model 5.1.
Although the inclusion of controls lead to some misspecification of explained variance in the
models where they are included, the notable feature is that throughout  models 1.0 to 7.1, the
signs of the estimated regression coefficients are unaltered and their size is remarkably stable.
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That is, age and size effects are minor and do not in any way change the conclusion of step one
and two.
-----------------------------------
Table 4 about here
-----------------------------------
Estimation: step three. The results in Table 4 show that there is no direct  effect  of a
strategic frame or a cost frame on financial performance (model 8.0). Again we can discard the
marginal increase in explanatory power in model 8.1 due to the multicollinearity introduced by
the controls. The results support the idea that cognitive frames providing broad managerial
orientation effect uncertainty through information processing. This is not sufficient to support
H3.1 and H3.2. Since the necessary condition to support H3.1 and H3.2 was established in step
three, we further need step four to provide the sufficient test  for a relation between cognitive
frames and financial performance.
Estimation: step four. Model 9.1 establishes that the effect of a cost frame on financial
performance is negative and significant when the insturmental variable (IV) uncertainty is
included. Given the results in step three, this confirms H3.2. Model 9.0 and model 9.3 are not
significant and thus rejected. Moreover, model 9.2 and 9.3 are rejected due to misspecification
(p-value for Sargan’s Chsq < 0.05). 
Model 10.0 and 10.1 establish that a strategic frame has a positive effect on financial
performance when the instrumental variables information processing and uncertainty,
respectively, are included. This confirms H3.1. The increase in explanatory power in model
10.2, compared with model 10.0 and 10.1, further shows that both instrumental variables
contribute to better explanation. The inclusion of controls in model 10.3 results in the
previously observed marginal increase in explanatory power without altering the sign or
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changing the size of the coefficient much. Note further that neither model 10.2 (p-value for
Sargan’s Chsq = 0.966) or model 10.3 (p-value for Sargan’s Chsq = 0.723) can be rejected due
to misspecification but model 10.2 provides the better fit. 
An issue of concern is that the validity of our results may be compromised by response
bias, social desirability or common methods bias. Note that the issue of common methods bias
only concerns analyses where financial performance was not used as independent variable.
When financial performance was used, the dependent variable (archival data) and independent
variables (questionnaire) differed in methods. Consequently, there is no concern of common
methods bias regarding these results.
We shall first address the issue of social desirability bias which refers to the respondent’s
tendency to choose response that reflects societally approved behaviours (see e.g. Zerbe and
Paulhaus, 1987). One way to deal with this issue is to include scales of social desirability and
subsequently correlate measures with such a scale. Although appealing in terms of tractability
there are a number of problems related to this approach (Zerbe and Paulhaus, 1987) which
motivate  assessment of social desireability on basis of the rather unique context of our survey
(referred to in the above). We shall consider problems related to frankness, adequate
knowledge, and response adjustment (see e.g. Nunnally and Bernstein 1994: ch 9). 
According to the stated purpose of the questionnaire and the relationship between the
respondents and Kommunekemi, conscious deviations from frank response are unlikely. There
was simply no gain or loss, whatsoever, for the respondents to over- or underemphasize the
uncertainty related to environmental issues such as the importance of various different
stakeholders, since: (1) Kommunekemi is the mandatory waste treatment alternative for the
firms, (2) there is a proven trust-relationship between the firms and Kommunekemi (evidenced
in the transcripts of the 31 interviews), and (3) Kommunekemi is simply indifferent about the
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level of uncertainty regarding environmental issues such as what stakeholders the firm considers
Therefore, we have a high degree of confidence that the results reported in the present study do
not reflect social desirability response due to deviation from frank response. 
As aforementioned, the respondents were either the CEO or the executive EH&S
officer. In both instances there is no doubt that the respondent possessed adequate knowledge.
Clearly, we cannot rule out the possibility of response adjustment. The problem would
be most severe if the questions were not priorly considered or the respondents possessed
inadequate knowledge. Since we can positively rule out both possibilities it is likely that the
situational adjustment was limited. A triangulation with the transcipts of the qualitat ive
interviews lends support to this assessment. The clear impression reflected in the transcripts is
that there is stability in response across the two situations. The evidence contained in the
questionnaires and the interviews largely converge. For the above reasons we have confidence
that our results do not reflect severe bias due to socially desirable response.
The possibility of common methods bias only concerns results where information
processing and uncertainty were used as independent variable. However, due to the results
obtained in step four,  all est imates involving these two variables were validated by their
inclusion as instrumental variables in analyses with financial performance as the dependent
variable. Therefore, we can effectively rule out common methods bias.
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The present study extends the capabilities- or competence-based theory by appealing to
cognitive frames as co-determinants of persistent performance differentials. The empirical test
provides evidence from survey data and archival data (ROA) that support the suggested causal
chain between cognitive frames and financial performance through information processing and
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perceived uncertainty. We are aware of no previous theoret ical work that explicitly states this
causal relation or any empirical survey that tests this relation. Furthermore, the present paper
introduced a novel method to estimate path models when the usual approach is infeasible. In the
following we shall focus on the theoretical implications of our results.
The general theoretical basis underlying our argument is Simon’s (1987) work on
bounded rationality and the derived idea of imperfect environmental matching. Further and
massive empirical and theoretical support for the assumption of imperfect environmental
matching can be found in recent studies of error in decision making (Reason, 1990). Thus,
according to Reason (1990), the imperfect correspondance between cognitive frames and social
regularities is a result of the simplification involved in elimination of differences among
occurences perceived as similar. The implication is that occurences not frequently encountered
tend to be ignored (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Reason, 1990). We base our view that cognitive
frames generally direct information processing on this simplification hypothesis, combined with
the assumption of a relatively persistent cognitive rigidity. Both assumptions have been
challenged, however.
To some extent, the simplification hypothesis implies a conjecture of simple-minded
decision makers, a view challenged by Walsh (1988). Walsh’s (1988) results speak loud and
against the hypothesis of simplification biases that direct information processing but the
evidence in favour of this hypothesis speaks even louder. Walsh’s (1988) assertion on the lack
of evidence that managers are actually victims of suboptimal information processing strategies
seems to pass over a number of relevant studies too hastily. For example, Hogarth and
Makridadis (1981) review 67 empirical studies on biases in acquisition and processing of
information. All studies support the idea of simplification biases associated with a principle of
similarity and frequency. Reason (1990) reviews the literature on research in human error and
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finds massive empirical evidence that  pervasive error-forms are associated with frequency- and
similarity-gambling related to well-known cognitive biases. Even if we find an impressive
amount of evidence supporting the idea of constrained information processing, Walsh’s (1988)
defence of managerial intelligence is well-taken. Rosman et al.’s (1994) warning that agents are
portrayed as either rigid or flexible is in the same spirit. It all depends on the particular talent of
the decision maker, the task at hand, the situation, and the context of the decision.
In the present study, we have studied experienced decision makers who processed
information associated with environmental issues. All were employees in firms that produce
large amounts of hazardous waste and as evidenced in Klassen & Whybark (1999) as well as in
174 studies reviewed by Knudsen (1998), such issues are a source of uncertainty for firms. We
have further assumed that  general cognitive frames are rigid. 31 interviews conducted with a
subset of the respondents support this impression. We find it unlikely that decision makers shift
between a cost frame and a strategic frame on a daily basis.
Although our model leaves some room for imaginative, explorative and creative efforts,
it was suggested that decision making is framed within broad and relatively persistent categories
of what business is about. However, it is not the actual frames per se that is of interest in the
present study. The theoretical interest is in the effect such frames may have on performance
differentials. Indeed, the empirical results support  the general idea that the effect of cognitive
frames, through perceived uncertainty and information processing, can be traced to
performance. This effect may well have general validity when managers face changing, complex
and uncertain environments. There is no reason to believe that this effect is specific to
environmental issues. The general implication is that specific and relatively stable cognitive
frames channel the direction of information processing activities, influence the level of perceived
uncertainty and thus influences performance. The results thus support the general proposition
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that firm-specific cognitive frames are important co-determinants of persistent performance
differentials.
Turning to the specific implications of the present study, the results suggest that the
cognitive frame “cost focus” entails a possible ignorance-trap. According to our results, a cost
frame related to environmental issues has a positive effect on uncertainty related to such issues
and leads to an absence of information processing that could otherwise change the state of
ignorance. Even if negative financial performance increases search for alternatives, a cost frame
may lead managers to search in the neighbourhood of alternatives that has a direct link to short-
term efficiency gains. When the causes of negative performance are located in other
neighbourhoods, the firm will increasingly apply the wrong solutions and uncertainty increases.
Therefore, an ignorance-trap entails. By contrast, a strategic frame implies that samples from a
broader scope of alternatives, including more distant possibilities, may lead to a bet ter diagnosis
of the causes of negat ive financial performance. This raises the quest ion of how to sustain a
strategic frame in the face of an increase in search costs and an increase in the number of
possible reasons for bad performance. 
Levinthal and March (1991) suggest an assymetric relation between a cost frame and a
strategic frame. A cost frame will tend to be self-sustaining because a sample limited to the near
future provides positive feed-back since immediate pay-offs will tend to be positive. By
contrast, the longer into the future alternatives are sampled, the immediate pay-offs will tend to
be negative and the expected pay-offs will tend to have higher variance than alternatives
associated with a short time horizon. Thus, a cost frame will tend to sustain itself because a shift
to a strategic frame provides negative feed-back and a strategic frame must be sustained in spite
of negative feed-back in the short term. This points to a key issue implied by the indirect
relation between cognitive frames and performance suggested in the present work.  If this
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relation holds beyond the context of the present study, the time.horizon as a defining
characteristic of the scope within which cognitive frames are effective deserves further attention
in future research. It further points to the need for critical scrutiny of the limitations of our data. 
Apart from the measurement concerns previously raised, there is an obvious limitation in
our independent variables which are based on cross-sectional data. Even if the supplementary
31 interviews assured that a strategic- or cost-frame was a relative persistent feature, a future
longitudinal study is needed to account for the change in cognitive rigidities. Furthermore, we
have taken the approach of using the respondent as a representative individual. Clearly, an
important avenue for future research is to examine how differences in experience and
professionalization (see e.g. Rosman et al., 1994) influence cognitive frames over longer
periods of time. Also, it seems pertinent to explore whether uncertainty and information
processing may be a general mediator between cognitive frames and performance. A further but
perhaps too ambitious implication of our theoretical argument is the need for studies that track
the co-evolution of social regularities in society and cognitive frames in business organisations.
Finally, our study is limited to the particular cognitive frames studied and to issues related to the
natural environment. Even if the implications may well be general, we need further research in
other contexts and on different frames to test this assert ion.
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APPENDIX A
Since two-stage least-squares regression is not widely used, this appendix provides the model
and the test-statistics associated with the metod. Two-stage least-squares regression involves
two regressions of the linear form: the linear regression model and two-stage least squares.
The linear regression model
y is a n×1 matrix, X is a n×k matrix, the coefficient matrix $ is a k×1 matrix and e is a n×1
matrix.
Two-stage least-squares
The first step in two stage least squares estimation involves computation of the fitted values of
the independent observations X on a the n×s matrix Z of instrumental variables (n observations
on s instrumental variables and s$k) by means of a n×n projection matrix Pz. As shown in the
two equations below, the second step then involves computing the IV-coefficients by regressing
y on X-hat. Estimations in the two steps are obtained through OLS-regression.
Test statistics in two-stage least-squares
The appropriate measure for assessing the goodness of fit in models involving instrumental
variables (such as the linear two-stage least-squares method) is the generalized R2 (GR2)
proposed by Pesaran & Smith (1994). Pesaran & Smith (1994) show that GR2 is a valid
discriminator for models that are not mis-specified. It is computed by the following formula
where e2SLS are the residuals from step two in the two-stage least-squares estimation (as shown
in the equations in the above). The first formula shows how the GR2 is computed and the
second formula shows how this measure is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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Misspecification test of two-stage least-squares models
It is well known that regression involving instrumental variables is problematic due to the
possibility of misspecification. The test proposed by Sargan (1964) provides the necessary
statististics to evaluate if a model is misspecified. The test is based on the following statistics
given the null hypothesis that the s (s>k) instrumental variables contained in Z are valid
instruments:
Under the null-hypothesis, Sargan misspecification (SM) statistics is asymptotically P2
distributed with s-k degrees of freedom (s is the number of instrumental variables and k is the
number of $’s estimated).
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TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations
Economic Performance mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5
ROA 1995
ROA 1994
ROA 1993
ROA 1992
ROA 1991
Cumulative ROA 1991-95
 1.08
 1.08
 1.07
 1.07
 1.07
 1.46
 .09
 .09
 .08
 .08
 .07
 .47
.73***
.59***
.47***
.37***
.79***
.67***
.46***
.43***
.83***
 .62***
 .52***
 .84***
 .64***
 .77***  .72***
Cost frame related to environmenta l issues
Environmental intiatives make products costly 3.46 1.21
Environmental initiatives decrease competitiveness 2.74 1.30    .63***
Scale: (1) Disagree completely, (2),  (3),  (4),  (5) Agree completely. Cronbachs Alpha for additive scale: .77
Strategic frame related to environmenta l issues
Environmental awareness is a strategic advantage 3.46 1.29
Environmental cert ificat ion gives compet itive
advantage
4.14 .87    .43***
Scale: (1) Disagree completely, (2),  (3),  (4),  (5) Agree completely. Cronbachs Alpha for additive scale: .57
Degree of Information Processing Related to the Natural Environment
We often discuss env. problems in our firm 4.08 1.00
Our firm has formulated a clear env. policy 3.75 1.24   .44***
All employees know our environmental policy 3.45 1.19   .48***   .73***
Top management is strongly involved with the
firm's environmental policy
3.92 1.18   .48***   .73***   .64***
All employees take actively part in the
implementation of the firm's env. policy
3.46 1.10   .36***   .56***   .56***   .66***
Scale: (1) Disagree completely, (2),  (3),  (4), (5) Agree completely. Cronbachs Alpha for additive scale: .87
Uncertainty related to environmental issues
Uncertainty leads to delays in handling
environmental problems
2.02 1.05
We are generally uncertain how to integrate
environmental issues in management and
operations
2.03 1.10   .44***
Scale: (1) Disagree completely, (2),  (3),  (4), (5) Agree completely. Cronbachs Alpha for additive scale: .60
Controls
Age of the firm (years) 52 39
Number of employees 471 1451 0.174*
Total amount of dangerous waste  (tonnes) 156 379 0.091 0.172† 
† <0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
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TABLE 2
Regression Results
Variable Model 1.0 Model 1.1 Model 2.0 Model 2.1 Model 3.0 Model 3.1
(Constant) (0,400) (0,459)  (0,423)  -0.484  -0.453  (0,512)
Info. Proc.  -0,292**   -0,285**
-0.095 (0,099)
Cost frame -0.022 -0.007 0,248** 0,275** 0,235** 0,258**
-0.079 -0.07 -0.068 -0.075 -0.067 -0.073
Strat. frame 0,494*** 0,509***  -0,264**  -0,309*** -0.109 -0,156
-0.064 (0,081) (0,084) -0.086 -0.096 (0,098)
Controls
Age -0.087 -0.066 -0,094
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Employees 0.112 0,183* 0,215*
0 0 (0,000)
Waste 0.062 -0.088 -0,096
(0,000) 0 0
R-Square 0,237 0,267 0.143 0.183 0.194 0.229
Dependent model 1.0-1.1: Degree of information processing
Dep ende nt mo del 2.0 -3.1: U ncerta inty
Standard errors are in parenthe sis.
All models significant, p<0,001
† <0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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TABLE 3
Regression Results
Variable Model 4.0 Model 4.1 Model 5.0 Model 5.1 Model 6.0 Model 6.1 Model 7.0 Model 7.1
(Constant)  (0,324)  (0,230)  (0,097)  (0,113)  (0,167)  (0,173)  (0,235)  (0,247)
Info. Proc. 0,257** 0,281** 0,213* 0,262*
(0,043) (0,042) (0,047) (0,047)
Uncertainty -0,381*** -0,397***  -0,223*  -0,199* -0,13 -0,077
(0,084) (0,087) (0,043) (0,043) (0,047) (0,046)
Controls
Age  -0,190* -0,087 -0,04 -0,023
(0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
Employees 0,205* -0,045 -0,112 -0,103
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Waste -0,037 -0,007 -0,053 0,016
0 0 0 (0,000)
R-Square 0.138 0.172 0,042 0,016 0,058 0,058 0.068 0.055
Dep ende nt mo del 4.0 -4.1: Degree of information processing
Depen dent mo del 5.0-7.1: Ec onom ic performa nce, long-term
Adjusted R-square and standardized coefficients reported.
All models significant, p<0,001
† <0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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TABLE 4
Regression Results
Variable Model 8.0 Model 8.1
(Constant)   (0,226)  (0,244)
Cost frame 0,034 0,097
(0,36) (0,037)
Strat. frame 0,115 0,161†
(0,045) (0,043)
Controls
Age -0,060
(0,001)
Employees -0,054
(0,000)
Waste 0,076
(0,000)
R-Square 0,000 0,001
Dependent, 8.0-8.1: Economic performance
Standard errors are in parenthe sis.
Models not significant at p<0,10.
† <0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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TABLE 5
IV-Regression Results (two-stage least-squares)
Variable Model 
9.0
Model 
9.1
Model
 9.2
Model
 9.3
Model
10.0
Model
10.1
Model
10.2
Model
10.3
(Constant)   (1,777)  (0,461)   (0,464)  (0,224) (0,377) (0,625)   (0,365)  (0,315)
Cost frame -0,754  -0,743* -0,734† -0,130
(0,539) (0,149) (0,150) (0,072)
Strat. frame 0,527* 0,705* 0,550** 0,519**
(0,099) (0,163) (0,095) (0,082)
IV
Info. Proc. X X X X X X
Uncertainty X X X X X X
Age X X
Employees X X
Waste X X
R-Square 0,003 0,023 0,022 0,000 0,045 0,029 0,057 0,062
GR-Square 0,069 0,029 0,032 0,003 0,069 0,029 0,076 0,082
Dependent model 9.0: Economic performance, long-term, p-value for model: 0,245
Dependent model 9.1: Economic performance, long-term, p-value for model: 0,049
Dependent model 9.2: Economic performance, long-term, p-value for model: 0,052; Sargan's CHSQ(1df): 3,885 (p=0,049)
Dependent model 9.3: Economic performance, long-term, p-value for model: 0,508; Sargan's CHSQ(4df): 12,016 (p=0,017)
Dependent model 10.0: Economic performance, long-term, p-value for model: 0,032
Dependent model 10.1: Economic performance, long-term, p-value for model: 0,010
Dependent model 10.2: Economic performance, long-term, p-value for model: 0,005; Sargan's CHSQ(1df): 0,002 (p=0,966)
Dependent model 10.3: Economic performance, long-term, p-value for model: 0,004; Sargan's CHSQ(4df): 2,067 (p=0,723)
Dependent model 11.1: Economic performance, long-term, p-value for model: 0,015; Sargan's CHSQ(3df): 1,069 (p=0,.785)
Standard errors are in parenthe sis.
† <0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Figure 1: Paths and hypothesized relations. Since the model cannot be identified (and the
constructs cost frame and strategic frame are correlated), the estimation follows the four-step
“diamond-procedure” outlined below.
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Figure 2: Estimating an over-identified model by decomposition into four estimation steps. X:
cognitive frame, Z1: information processing, Z2. uncertainty, Y: financial performance.
